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I.
In the current globalization debate the law appears to be entangled in
economic and political developments which move into a new dimension of de-
politicization, de-centralization and de-individualization. For all the correct
observations in detail, though, this debate is bringing about a drastic
(polit)economic reduction of the role of law in the globalization process that I
wish to challenge in this paper. Here one has to take on Wallerstein’s
misconception of “worldwide economies” according to which the formation of
the global society is seen as a basically economic process.
1 Autonomous
globalization processes in other social spheres running parallel to economic
globalization need to be taken seriously. In protest against such
(polit)economic reductionism several strands of the debate, among them the
neo-institutionalist theory of “global culture”, post-modern concepts of global
legal pluralism, systems theory studies of differentiated global society and
various versions of “global civil society” have shaped a concept of a
polycentric globalization
2. From these angles the remarkable multiplicity of the
world society, in which tendencies to re-politicization, re-regionalization and
re-individualization are becoming visible at the same time, becomes evident
3.
I shall contrast two current theses on the globalization of law with two less
current counter-theses:
First thesis: globalization is relevant for law because the emergence of global
markets undermines the control potential of national policy, and therefore also
the chances of legal regulation.
First counter-thesis: globalization produces a set of problems intrinsic to law
itself, consisting in a change to the dominant lawmaking processes.
Second thesis: globalization means that the law institutionalizes the world-
wide shift in power from governmental actors to economic actors.
Second counter-thesis: globalization means that the law has a chance of
contributing to a dual constitution of autonomous sectors of world society.
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II.
The narrow view sees above all a crisis of law sparked off by the globalization
of the economy: world markets are taking the control instruments away from
national politics, entailing an evaporation of expectations of control through
law too, which is seen as only an instrument for the political regulation of
society
4. The corresponding hopes are concentrated on political responses to
the de-nationalization of politics, energetic pushes toward political unification
processes at European and global levels, and on concepts of cosmopolitan
democracy or global policy-making, strengthening the democratic potential of
supranational political processes systematically, inter alia by making
extensive use of legal norms
5.
In Streeck’s cold critique of such “concrete utopias”
6, this view hopelessly
over-estimates not just the democratization potential of global political
processes and the chances for global policy-making, but also the control
capacity of transnational law and the guarantees of individual action through
fundamental rights. At the same time, however, the inherent range of
problems for law itself in globalization are overlooked
7. For the deconstruction
to which law is exposed in processes of constituting a global law comes not
just from outside, from the shrinking control potential of politics vis-à-vis the
economy, but also and especially from within, from an erosion of fundamental
validity claims of law itself. A process of globalization of law itself is taking
place in relative distance from political globalization, and in it the traditional
forms of law are deconstructed through its norm-producing routines
themselves
8.
For the source of the new global law is no longer only institutionalized politics
which is still not really global but only inter-national politics, but also and
especially other social systems that in the race to globalization have long
overtaken politics
9. The economy, not just the economy but other social
sectors such as science, technology, the mass media, medicine, education or
transport are, on their specific path to globalization, developing a massive
requirement for norms that is met not by governmental and intergovernmental
institutions but by themselves in direct action upon the law. Increasingly,
global private regimes are producing substantive law without the State,
without national legislation or international treaties
10. Everywhere the
cancerous spread of private regulation, agreements and dispute resolution is
growing; in short, lawmaking is happening “alongside the State”
11. The
requirements of global societies’ self-created laws are then not at all primarily
political control of social processes, but derive from original needs for security
of expectations and solution of conflicts.
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In this dynamic, the most dramatic changes are as it were taking place at the
edges of law, in the structural linkages of law with other social subsystems:
A political constitution, formed in the history of the nation states as a linkage
between politics and law, and at the same time claiming to govern law’s
relations to other social sectors, is not present at global level
12. Instead, here
there as it were naturally emerge a multiplicity of subconstitutions – linkages
of global law to other global subsystems – that to date have escaped
constitutional governance dominated by politics. It is no wonder, since the
structural linkage to politics happens at global level now only through the
cumbersome and not very efficient institutions of international public law.
The focus in lawmaking is shifting to private regimes, that is, to agreements
among global players, to private market regulation through multinational
enterprises, internal rulemaking within international organizations,
interorganizational negotiating systems, and world-wide standardization
processes
13. The dominant sources of law are now to be found at the
peripheries of law, at the boundaries with other sectors of world society that
are successfully engaging in regional competition with the existing centers of
lawmaking – national parliaments, global legislative institutions and
intergovernmental agreements.
Justice in the narrower sense, the national and international courts, is seeing
counterparts develop in quasi-private bodies for resolving conflicts in
society
14. International organizations, courts of arbitration, mediation bodies,
ethical committees and treaty systems are developing into courts of private
justice, acting as an organized subsystem of world law, but getting along
without prior governmental infrastructural provision
15. Autonomous global law
is increasingly basing itself on its own resources. International organizations,
multinational enterprises, global law firms, global funds, global associations,
global arbitration courts, are legal institutions that are pushing forward the
global lawmaking process
16.
All in all, in globalization dominant lawmaking is shifting from the centers of
law which had been politically institutionalized in the nation state (legislature
and judiciary) to the peripheries of law, to the boundaries between the law and
other globalized social sectors. The new world law is primarily peripheral,
spontaneous and social law. Private government, private regulation and
private justice are becoming central sources of law
17 - phenomena intrinsically
legal that within the nation state had been successfully shoved off into the
grey areas of non-legal factuality only because they were caught up in and
disciplined by a comprehensive set of rules in national law. On a world scale,
however, legal regulation of social activities by private actors is effectively
escaping from the thoroughly institutionalized framework conditions of the
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nation state without comparable framework conditions growing up, or even
being within sight. In the global private regimes an effective self-
deconstruction of law is coming about that is quite simply setting essential
basic principles of national law out of force: the derivation of validity of legal
norms in a hierarchy of sources of law, the legitimation of law through a
political constitution, the making of law by parliamentary bodies, the rule of
law based on institutions, procedures and principles, and the guarantee of
individual freedoms through basic rights that have been fought for politically.
III.
Ought this sort of “spontaneous” global law to be seen as a hypermodern
variant of traditional customary law? There are indeed attempts to equip this
honourable, but false, category with new respectability, particularly in
international public law
18. What is there in the positivization decisions of the
private governance regimes that can be seen as corresponding to the
consuetudo longa of states as subjects of international law? Where is the
opinio iuris doctorum?
Admittedly, old customary law and the new private regimes do have
something in common. Both bodies of rules have a social origin, and did not
emerge from positive lawmaking by a national sovereign; indeed the
sovereign is no longer even centrally involved in their legal recognition. And
they have no central body to allocate validity. But the differences weigh much
more. True customary law grows out of long-term processes of diffuse
communication and recursive interaction that particularly in traditional
societies constitute a dominant type of law-making. Social norms owed to
silently operating forces of informal co-ordination of conduct are in certain
circumstances taken over into the legal system as customary law
19. By
comparison with such diffuse communication processes the new private
regimes are a typical product of social differentiation. They are highly
specialized forms of explicit norm-making within functional subsystems in the
modern world. They emerge not on the basis of informal co-ordination of
conduct in a gradual process of repeated interactions, but through positive
lawmaking in organized decision-making processes in specialized foraml
organizations.
20 That is why they cannot be celebrated as new “spontaneous
rules” á la Hayek
21, able to stand up against the constructivist excesses of the
nation states on a world scale
22. For against Hayek’s artificial separation of
constructivist and spontaneous lawmaking and his unrestrained
overestimation of habits and customs, the specificity of the neo-spontaneous
law lies only in the fact that it is based not on governmental decision but on
more or less thoroughly organized social processes that – and here is the
problem for legal policies - each bring about a very specific selectivity of the
norm-making.
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How then are the new qualities to be understood, if not as resembling
customary law? Calling them “spontaneous” lawmaking without further ado is
certainly a false romanticism, in view of the “constructivistically” planned and
implemented decisions in the private regimes on positivized rules in ISO
standards, in standard business contracts, in thoroughly codified sets of rules
in multinational enterprises, and international specialized associations.
Obviously, though, what we are looking at is a new and peculiar mixture of
spontaneous and organized processes. Its special feature seems to be that by
contrast with traditional customary law there has been a reversal of the
relationship between spontaneous and organized norm-making we have
known till now. Increasing formalization, organization and positivization of
social norms versus increasing spontaneization, fragmentation and
chaoticization of their juridification – is this supposed to be the characteristic
feature of neo-spontaneous law? An orderly world society vis-à-vis an
disorderly world law?
Traditionally, while spontaneous rule-making (usages, social norms) was
concentrated in society, on the periphery of the legal system, organized rule-
making took place at the center of law (courts, legislation). This prefigured a
strict conceptual and institutionalized separation of normativity and validity.
The substantive constitution of norms in society was clearly separated from
their validity-allocating transformation into law. Relative indeterminacy,
diffuseness and vagueness of long-term norming processes in society were
counterposed to clearly outlined procedures of validity allocation,
organizational hierarchies of lawmaking bodies, a system of precedents and a
thorough textualization of law. To this there  corresponded a clear trend to
minimize customary law in modern societies.
23 Legal doctrine tends to down-
play it into a “possible inspiration” for official lawmaking
24. Jurists usually look
only at the legal validity allocation of the social norms in question by courts
and legislators, but do not bother particularly about the social origin of the
norms. It is only the (legislative or judicial) validity allocation that was of
interest. But that means losing sight of one feature essential to legal decision-
making: how ought the law to respond to the differing selectivity of diverse
social norm-setting processes that distort the “justice” of social norms?
The category of customary law ended up by losing its shape entirely. As the
act of judicial decision increasingly took center stage and social processes
came to be regarded as merely sociological facts and therefore juridically
irrelevant, lawyers began more or less to equate judge-made law and
customary law
25. Thus today in private law totally differently structured
institutions like conditional bills of sale and commercial letters of confirmation,
i.e. typical social norming of economic transaction on the one hand, and on
the other such typical judicial innovations inspired by legal scholarship as
culpa in contrahendo and breach of contort duties are equally treated as
modern forms of customary law
26. In this way customary law and judge-made
law, two equally questionable ways of making law in the light of the official
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legislative monopoly on lawmaking, were able to support and legitimate each
other. But at the same time there was a loss of the sense that the legal
transformation of social norms has to be subject to quite different procedures
and criteria than the constitution of norms through the judicial dispute-settling
process itself.
By contrast today in the process of globalization one can note a reversal of
the relationship between the spontaneous and the organized. Since there is
no global political body to underpin the institutionalization of an organized
sphere of decision in law politically, the genuinely legal norm-setting process
becomes fragmented in the wide open spaces of the Brave New World,
uncoordinately and uncontrollably. To that extent this justifies the talk of the
“New Middle Ages” in global post-modernity
27. So does the observation that
“the world legal system looks more like the types of order in tribal societies,
meaning that it has to renounce organized sanctioning power and authentic
definition of infringements of law on the basis of known rules”
28. On the other
hand, however, the thorough rationalization of social subspheres on a world
scale has the consequence that social norms are based increasingly less on
spontaneous co-ordination of conduct but are increasingly positivized, i.e.
brought into validity on the basis of highly organized “private” decision-making
processes. Both together amount to the tendency to have organized norm-
making in social subspheres at the periphery of law and spontaneous norm-
making at the center of law.
This changes the relationship between normativity and validity. Since at global
level clear-cut fully institutionalized procedures and centralized decision-
making bodies are lacking, the validity criteria for law are extremely diffuse.
This is connected with one typical feature of global society, for which
“heterarchical, connectionistic, network-type linkage of communications at the
level of organizations and professions”
29 is typical. In view of the
uncoordinated multiplicity of decentrally organized legal deciding bodies, the
question of what legal rule actually applies can be answered unambiguously
now only for the already decided individual case. Establishing the validity of a
rule in world law that extends temporally and spatially is, however paradoxical
it may sound, extremely difficult if not impossible. For on a world scale there is
no decision-making hierarchy, no established body of precedents, but only
heterarchical, spontaneous co-ordination among various lawmaking bodies
30.
This explains the phenomenon, extremely irritating to jurists trained in national
law, of the only weak identification of norms. Hence the remarkably old-
fashioned appeal to diffuse “customary law” (but without consuetudo and
without opinio juris), the rather unrealistic recourse to such corporatist legal
forms as the lex mercatorum, the natural-law invocation of generally valid
legal principles of the international legal community, the relying on the
harmonizing of national systems, the exaggerated hopes for convergence in
comparative law, the reliance on legal scholarship and the secret but legally
authoritative negotiating processes at international conferences of experts.
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At the same time, however, it also becomes remarkably indefinite where the
locus of the positivization of law, the locus where binding decisions on
normativity and validity are taken, is to be found. Wherever you look, the
relevant validity decision appears always being taken somewhere else. In the
global private regimes where the typical combination of organized social
norm-making and spontaneous processes of lawmaking occurs, the norm
production is decentralized to a multiplicity of political and private actors
without it being possible to make out any clear decision-taking center. The
lawmaking process is at the same time remarkably circular: the actors
constantly appeal to the validity of legal norms the basis for the validity of
which is however questionable. And just this ongoing practice of pretension to
be law – or even swearing by legal myths – and not, say, a decision,
influenced by a lobby of private actors, of a central lawmaking body is what
brings the new law into validity
31. A striking example is the lex mercatoria, so
reproached for its phantom nature
32. It is on the same mechanism that
standardization is based, coming about silently in a sequence of very wordy
international expert conferences. And a current example of such “neo-
spontaneous” lawmaking in non-economic fields is the law of humanitarian
intervention, where the persuasive role of the media in the “emerging
international law” cannot possibly be overestimated. It is not the breach of law
that makes the scandal, but the scandal that makes the new law. Another
example are such NGOs as Greenpeace or Amnesty International, which
appeal continually to the validity of human rights although these have not in
any way been made positive through treaties or court judgments. A whole
range of really non-legitimated private actors is involved in this peculiar
invocation of law: media, professional associations, non-governmental
organizations and multinational enterprises
33.
Ultimately, the selectivity of rule-making changes by comparison with the
traditionally political positivization of law. This is a challenge for legal policies
to develop criteria and procedures which would compensate for this
selectivity. It is no longer enough for the law to become sensitive to the
selectivity of genuinely political institutions further and set up more or less
openly compensatory procedures and criteria within the law for cases of
“failure of politics”. Here, in the specific selectivity of neo-spontaneous global
law, there lies the challenge for the theory of sources of law. For the law of the
nation state disposed in relation to “private” normings of a range of political
and administrative corrective mechanisms (judicial review of standard
contracts, regulatory bodies, corporatist negotiations with decisive
involvement of the state). But these are all largely absent on a world scale. If
the theory of sources of law is to classify not just by origins of norms but
according to social legitimation and legal monitoring of different types of
lawmaking, then it has to distinguish the global norm-making processes
strictly according to the various social rationalities involved and their various
specific selectivities, in order to be able to develop differing procedures and
criteria for their legal review.
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In the relationship between law and politics the nation state tradition has set a
model that still has to be developed in the relationship of law to other social
sectors in analogous fashion. In what respect does the law have to adapt to
the rationality of the other system, and in what respect clearly distance itself
from it? In national legal systems typical techniques of distancing from law
produced in institutionalized politics are developed: depoliticization and
neutralization of party political decisions, reconstruction of result-oriented
“policies” as universal legal principles, modified incorporation of political
decisions in legal doctrine according to legal criteria of consistency, and most
massively, of course, the constitutional review of legislative acts. But legal
review of political legislation is, as the example of party financing shows, all
the more present the less the political process is structurally capable of
adopting regulations adequate to the matter. On the other side, however,
there has also – and this is often overlooked – been a far-reaching adaptation
of modern law to the logic of politics, in which the programmes of law, not just
the contents of norms but also the methodological programmes, were
drastically “politicized”: from teleological interpretation via policy orientation
and interest balancing up to impact assessment and consequentialist
orientation.
But where is the analogous policy-mix of distance and adaptation that global
law would have to develop vis-à-vis non-political sectors if the latter are now
increasingly responsible for non-legislative lawmaking? Global technological
standards require different procedures and criteria of legal review than do
international general terms of business or global conduct codes of
international professional associations.
Global standardization processes, coming about partly through market forces,
partly through being laid down internally in international organizations, partly
through negotiations between private and public actors, are among the most
important sources of global law
34. If scientific, technical or medical cognitive
standards are normed and ultimately juridified, then here too the law has
develop an adequate mixture of distance and adaptation vis-à-vis science and
technology. The depoliticization of legislative decisions corresponds to a
“descienticization” of standards. The borderline between lawful and unlawful is
(necessarily) fixed “arbitrarily” without adequate scientific foundation. At the
same time it is charged with political, moral and economic aspects. In this way
standards turn into “trans-scientific issues”
35. Procedures and criteria for this
transformation are still largely desiderata that would go far beyond the usual
call to involve the particpation of interest groups concerned. On the other
hand a scientization of law comparable to the politicization of legal
methodology is coming about. Irrespective of whether the law makes exact
threshold values positive or makes reference to the “state of knowledge”, it
still makes itself dependent on scientific and technological development. Here
too, procedures and criteria are available only in rudimentary fashion, and as
the debate on “science courts” is showing have not yet got beyond legal policy
approaches.
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Rulemaking within  international organizations are a futher source of global
law. Routines and hierarchical lawmaking within these organizations are
rendered positive internally, and then juridified in conflict situations through
relatively informal procedures
36. Here too the law still has to find an adequate
mixture of distance from and adjustment to the formal organization. Legal
norms marked as valid must be separated clearly from the micro-politics of
the organization, even if they have their origin there. On the other hand,
lawmaking remains dependent on the processes in the international
organizations. General clauses of “the interest of the organization” are
suitable for legally combining aspects within the organization and outside.
Mutatis mutandis the same applies to the role of law in relation to rulemaking
by international negotiating systems, organizational agreements and
contractual agreements of various private actors, but also to general terms of
business of multinational enterprises. If the law incorporates private regulation
of markets by collective actors, then here too the point is a combination of de-
economization of transaction expectations with a continuing dependence of
law on economic processes.
Accordingly, instead of talking of a unitary “customary law” at global level,
various types of social law linking up with various global sectors and typified
by differing internal organization of norm production have to be distinguished,
and differing requirements as to the law’s distance and adjustment have to be
correspondingly clearly developed.
IV.
The standard repertoire of the globalization debate includes a second thesis:
the law’s role in globalization consists essentially only in formalizing the new
shift of power between governmental and economic actors in legal terms. The
law is seen as recording the global primacy of the economy, and developing
the appropriate concepts, norms and principles. Here again I should like to
criticize the (polit)economic narrowing of the focus in the legal debate and
raise a counter-thesis: globalization simultaneously opens the chance for law
to institutionalize a dual constitution in sectors of global society.
Ought one in this connection to speak of a global civil society able to oppose
the steering mechanisms of globalized markets and political arenas with a
third aspect, a civil and democratic one? In fact, hopes for global potential for
democracy are, along with a renewal of the political system, concentrating on
the emergence of a civil society on a global scale, opening up new chances
for re-politicization and re-individualization.
37
“Finally new international systems have also arisen that are able
more or less to escape the grip of the State: think only of the
regulatory systems for international financial markets, the
Internet, the networks of non-governmental organizations, the
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decision-making structures of transnational groups, but also, on
the downside, of organized, globally organized, crime” ... “yet
they also constitute a global potential for democratization.”
38
What are the catalysts of a global civil society that might be able to oppose
the economic and political dynamic with a credible dynamic of its own? Right
as it is to make clear that alongside politics and the economy other social
phenomena are pursuing a globalization path of their own, it seems difficult to
identify the new subjects of global society. Proposals for identification oscillate
between the idealization of social movements and concentration on formal
bureaucratic organizations.
In view of spectacular successes recently, protest movements are as it were
the natural candidate for a democratic potential at world level
39. Yet as an
countervailing power to globalized economies and politics, they would no
doubt be hopelessly out of their depth. Admittedly they are indispensable in
their provocative focussing on pan-social problems that no specialized social
institution is taking up. And these provocations ought to become steadily more
important with the relative loss of power by national political institutions. Yet
their activities are only irritations: they themselves have little potential to solve
the problems they raise. Protest movements are at bottom parasitic. They
presuppose specialized institutions with high problem-solving potential, which
they accuse of over-specialized tunnel vision and can provoke into
innovations.
Ought one then to identify the global civil society with interest groups on a
world scale? Similarly to the interest group pluralism in nation states, they are
able to politicize civil-society problems and exercise political pressure upon
globally acting political institutions
40.  Yet this view suffers from its narrowing
down to politics, something that given the glaring weakness of genuinely
political institutions in world society has particularly fatal outcomes.
If not protest movements or lobby groups, then at least NGOs! The non-
governmental organizations have been seen as the new successful type of
global actor, between states and the multinationals
41. The astonishing
successes of Greenpeace, Amnesty International, environment groups and
human rights organizations seem to support a certain view that sees the
crystallization point of a global civil society here. For by contrast with the
diffuse protest movements, they have at their disposal the punch and chances
for rationalization of a formal bureaucratic organization that make them able to
communicate with government organizations and multinational groups. Yet
this organizational strength of theirs is at the same time their weakness in
civil-society. The false starting point lies in their formal organization. Formal
organization is no substitute for a social dynamic that might be comparable
with globalized markets and politics.
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The realistic candidate for a dynamic civil society is pluralism of autonomous
global social subsystems. This is the point where theories on “global culture”
and on global civil society, drawing attention to a plurality of global institutions
between the economy and politics, converge with systems-theory analyses of
the polycontextural world society
42. Only here can one find a social dynamic
that has a chance of autonomy vis-à-vis world markets and global political
arenas. Social subsystems pursuing a globalization path of their own in their
autonomous rationality are what at all in the first place forms the social basis
relatively independent of political and economic processes, starting from
which interest groups, non-governmental organizations and private
governance regimes on the one hand and social movements on the other can
develop their activities. The point is therefore a combination of social spheres
of autonomy and corresponding formal organizations, if we wish to speak at
all realistically of civil-society elements in global society.
Here chances are now becoming apparent for globalization that remain
hidden from a political and economic view. The dynamic of globalization
makes the peculiar relationship between a spontaneous and a formally
organized sphere visible within the various social subsystems. Globalization
means that many social sectors have the chance to free themselves from the
restrictions that nation-state politics had imposed on them. In the relationship
of the subsystems to each other, the cards are being re-dealt. Research,
education, the health system, the media, arts – for these social sectors the
globalization process is opening a chance not just to assert the autonomy of
their activities but also to establish an autonomous regime.
43 For law there
accordingly arises a new role of institutionalizing the dual constitution in the
various sectors.
In the nation states, autonomous spheres of civil society were not able to
develop any autonomous regimes worth mentioning. Research, education,
medicine, art, media – these social activities were located either in private
markets or in public hierarchies. Why were these autonomous activities
always colonized by political and economic regimes? After all, it is obvious
that their intrinsic rationality and their intrinsic normativity cannot fully develop
either under political dominance or under the profit principle of the market.
The answer is that in none of these areas has it to date been possible to
achieve a dualism of formally organized rationality and informal spontaneity
as a dynamic interplay without institutionalizing the primacy of the one or the
other. If spheres of civil society did conquer a certain autonomy vis-à-vis
political hierarchies and economic markets, then they tended to lose it again
by seeking a corporatist constitution. Attempting to institutionalize the whole
social activity sector as a formal organization at large, they stifled in their own
guild structures. They were, to be sure, able to establish a regime
autonomous from politics and the economy, but built it up only as a formally
organized sphere of bureaucratic decisions that had no adequate counterpart
in a correspondingly dynamic spontaneous sphere.
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By contrast a dual social constitution, that is, the internal differentiation and
recombination of a social subsystem into a spontaneous sector and an
organized sector, has to date historically been at all partially successful only in
the economy (enterprises/market) and politics (government/public opinion),
even though their potential too is not yet remotely exhausted. In the economy,
the relation between a market-constituted spontaneous sector and an
organized sector of enterprises is firmly established globally too. Though
highly organized economic enterprises can enormously enhance technical
expertise, organizational capacities and financing techniques, the “corporate
sector” has not succeeded in subjecting the economic sphere as a whole to its
control. Globalization itself has exposed the largest corporate groups to a
dynamic of world markets that is uncontrollable for them, and will not be
removed even by the most recent mega-mergers. In similar fashion, in politics
the organized sector of political parties and state administration are
counterposed to the spontaneous area of the electorate, lobbying and public
opinion. And here too globalization has enormously strengthened the
spontaneous sector of politics. In both systems, accordingly, a highly
rationalized decision sector is exposed to a chaotic challenge that it is unable
to dominate and control. The organized decision sector perceives hardly any
unambiguous signals from the spontaneous sector. It is, as it were,
condemned to freedom in its decisions. But once the critical decisions are
taken are the specific responsibility mechanisms of democracy and the
market triggered. This spontaneous/organized counterposition seems to be
one of the secrets of the success of liberal democracies. At the same time,
though, its democratic deficit  is the target of critique and point of
crystallization for political reform movements. The need will always be to keep
adjusting the precarious balance between spontaneous sector and organized
sector. And the classical democratic institutions – participation, deliberation,
election mechanisms – can serve to enhance the potential for democracy if
they build up on mutual controls by the spontaneous sector and the organized
sector.
This dualism of spontaneous sector and organized sector as a principle of
“successful” social differentiation is seldom looked at in its aspects of
democratic theory. Democracy, understood as an organizing principle that
goes beyond institutionalized politics, can work only if in different social fields
on the one hand decision potentials are highly specialized, organized and
rationalized, on the other hand, however, do not take over total control of their
social sector but are in turn exposed to a control process through a
decentralized multiplicity of spontaneous communication processes. Usually,
theories of social differentiation see only the autonomy into which sectors of
politics, the economy, law and religion develop since the late Middle Ages in
various thrusts. The critical difference/recombination between spontaneous
sector and organized sector within a subsystem by contrast is less well
theorized. It emerged in the economic system for the first time in Britain in the
Industrial Revolution. The economy was constituted neither as an atomistic
market among individual actors nor yet as a sum of formal organizations, but
as a complex interplay of formal organizations and spontaneously organized
markets. The corresponding political difference was constituted in the
American and French Revolutions as spontaneity of democracy and13
fundamental rights against the formal organization of the highly rationalized
state organization. In other subspheres, in contrast, there are only weak
approaches to this sort of internal differentiation/recombination of
spontaneous sector and organized sector. Perhaps closest, in the classical
German academic system there was an institutionalized interplay of highly
organized rationality in the universities and a spontaneous educated society.
44
Today’s descendant of this is perhaps best found in the US university system,
which has by contrast with the bureaucratized and politicized European
universities succeeded in combining organized and spontaneous activities in
a regime that is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis politics and the economy.
Accordingly, the thesis of globalization as a mere power shift  from political to
economic actors is going in the wrong direction. Also at stake are different
social sectors and their autonomy. The stifling of social activities in political
hierarchies and administrative bureaucracies is, to be sure, obvious. While the
shift to the economy opens up the dynamic interplay of spontaneous market
and organized enterprises, control through profit blocks the intrinsic rationality
of civil-society areas no less than does control through political power. Their
development becomes possible only once they manage to establish an
autonomous regime of organized decisions and spontaneous control
processes identical neither with the profit-controlled market nor with power-
controlled political processes
45.
Can constitutions for civil liberties in the globalization processes be identified
as social structural opportunities, or indeed legally institutionalized? World-
wide research, to the extent it does not get caught up entirely in the wake of
economic market processes, seems to show certain tendencies towards the
development of a global spontaneous area. The issues are: depoliticization,
debureaucratization, forms of non-economic competition, pluralization of
research financing, competition among research promotion institutions.
Similar trends can be discerned in the education sector, where the world-wide
competition of universities is driving them out of political and bureaucratic
tutelage and increasingly exposing them to the control dynamic of their own
spontaneous sector.
Globalization as opportunity for the law would, then, mean institutionalizing
constitutions for global villages of social autonomous sectors, in relative
distance from politics and the economy. Within the autonomous sectors there
would be potentials for re-politicization, re-regionalization and re-
individualization of norm-making processes. And the main attention of global
law would then have to be directed towards underpinning the duality of social
autonomy in the subsystems, i.e. a mutual control dynamic of spontaneous
sector and organized sector, in normative terms too.
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